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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING FOR U.S. TRADE
POLICY
In an innovative approach to discerning the governing norms of
international law, W. Michael Reisman proposes the use of interna-
tional incidents as epistemic units.1 He defines "incidents" as "an overt
conflict between two or more actors in the international system."' The
resolution of incidents "may be a more reliable indicator of interna-
tional law than are codes or case law."3 This analysis of the U.S.-Japan
semiconductor dispute can be seen as consistent with this approach.
* William J. Long is assistant professor of international relations at The Ameri-
can University and is an attorney. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance
of Maria L. Green and research support from The American University.
1. Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 15 (Reisman & Willard eds. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 16.
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However, as a political scientist equally accustomed to viewing in-
ternational law not only as a subfield of law, but as a subfield of the
wider discipline of international relations, this author considers the no-
tion of using case studies of particular incidents or issues rather than
cases to discern elite norms, such as those relied upon by Mr. Reisman,
as less than a revolutionary methodology. Case studies or issue-oriented
approaches to understanding international political events have enjoyed
a long and generally successful history."
By drawing from the discipline of international relations, this pa-
per offers two potential methodological refinements to the international
incidents approach to international law. First, it offers a means for de-
termining which incidents are important. Reisman notes that the for-
mulation of criteria by which incidents are selected is a formidable
challenge, yet he offers no method for meeting this challenge. This pa-
per maintains that, at least in matters of international trade, issues can
be characterized in terms of their importance, what one writer terms
their "valuation intensity,"5 by considering their interconnectedness to
actors in the system, such as powerful states, and their generality, de-
fined in terms of the degree of abstraction, in defining the issue and its
ability to generate secondary and tertiary issues.'
Second, the method for defining the scope of incidents 7 can be
more precisely delineated than Reisman suggests. Issues or incidents
move through definitive stages: origination, crises, resolution or dor-
mancy, and in this case, a denouement. 8
4. See, e.g., ROBERT RANDLE, ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS (1987); Vasquez & Mansbach, The Issue Cycle: Conceptualizing Long-term
Global Political Change, 37 INT'L ORGANIZATION, Spring 1983, at 257-79; Rosenau,
Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited, in CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND
LINKAGE POLITICS (J. Wilkenfeld ed. 1973).
An incident approach is also not without its inherent problems; however, Theodore
Lowi noted the limitations that often attend case studies: "It seems to me that the
reason for the lack of interesting and non-obvious generalizations from cases and other
specific empirical studies is clearly that the broad-gauge theories of politics are not
related, and perhaps not relatable to observable cases." Lowi, American Business, Pub-
lic Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POLITICS 686-87 (1964).
5. This term is taken from the typology developed by Robert Randle in his recent
work; see RANDLE, supra note 4, at 2. Randle defines valuation intensity as "the extent
to which (but principally, the intensity with which) peoples and their leaders value an
issue and its subject matter." Id.
6. id. at 5.
7. See Reisman, supra note 1, at 21.
8. Vasquez and Mansbach have developed a typology for the stages of issues: gen-
esis, crisis, ritualization, and resolution and dormancy. Vasquez & Mansbach, supra
note 4, at 257-79.
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This article begins by considering the contemporary and historic
setting for the U.S.-Japan semiconductor dispute. This normative base-
line is revisited at the end of the article when assessing the impact of
the semiconductor incident for the U.S. and the international trading
systems. The article also assesses the importance of the semiconductor
incident and traces the evolution of this issue from the United States'
perspective.
As reflected in recent U.S. bilateral and multilateral trade initia-
tives undertaken by the executive branch and the omnibus trade and
competitiveness bill recently passed by Congress, the norms and institu-
tional arrangements of U.S. trade policy could be changing rapidly. In
large measure, the potential changes in American trade law and policy
come in response to challenges posed by alterations in the global trad-
ing, production, and financial systems. Foremost perhaps is the decline
in American hegemony and the emergence of a more pluralist interna-
tional order characterized by the rise of Japan, the European Commu-
nity, and several of the newly-industrializing countries as global trading
powers. Relatedly, the nature of production has changed. Production of
goods has become increasingly internationalized and trade patterns and
technology transfers have altered accordingly. Firms now invest both in
extraction and manufacturing on a global scale wherever factor prices
or other inducements, often government-inspired, suggest the greatest
profitability. Financially, the size and speed of currency exchanges
dwarf the flow of goods and services. As a result, exchange rates set in
global currency markets now drive trade patterns rather than the con-
verse. These and other dramatic changes in the international economic
system have created uncertainty as actors seek a means of accommo-
dating such changes on both domestic and international planes.
Although many of these changes are not new and the process of
change is ineluctable, the impact of these changes on the United States
was not fully appreciated until recently, when, coupled with huge fiscal
imbalances and tight monetary policy, the United States found itself
with high interest rates and an overvalued dollar leading to overpriced
exports and unprecedented trade and payments deficits. This national
crisis for the United States, coupled with the perception of executive
branch inaction on trade in the early 1980's, set in motion important
domestic responses, first in Congress, then in the Executive.
Domestically, the resolution of the current trade crisis could lead
to a realignment among domestic actors in the area of U.S. trade pol-
icy and impair the tacit understanding between Congress and the Exec-
utive that insured a general commitment to an open trading system.
For example, diminution in the Executive's initiative and authority in
shaping trade policy as a consequence of trade law reform could dimin-
1988]
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ish America's commitment to liberal trade and the GATT system.
The immediate American foreign policy responses to its trade
problems have included efforts to revitalize and expand the scope of the
GATT negotiating process and initiate bilateral trade negotiations ad-
dressing several of these issues with Japan and other nations. The most
significant recent examples of bilateral accords include the recently
concluded U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Japan trade
agreement on semiconductors, and a host of market-opening sector-se-
lective ("MOSS") negotiations with Japan in varying stages of
completion.9
Against this backdrop of change, if not crisis, in U.S. trade policy,
this article will examine the recent, albeit not fully resolved, issue of
import pricing of Japanese semiconductors" ° and foreign market access
for U.S. semiconductors in Japan as a case study of an important trade
issue whose resolution may be significant in understanding the future
course of both U.S. trade politics and policy and the U.S. role in the
international trading regime. The immediacy of this issue means that
any conclusions drawn from it are somewhat tenuous. Nonetheless,
consideration of recent developments in the dispute may serve to
demonstrate potential changes in domestic political processes and inter-
national trade politics and offer insights into interpreting near-term
trends in these political systems.
Before turning to the issue, however, it is necessary to describe
briefly the history of U.S. trade policy to provide a benchmark by
which to assess the impact of the semiconductor dispute.
II. U.S. TRADE POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since World War II, U.S. trade policy has been characterized by
four major themes. First, American economic interests have become
9. The U.S. and Japan have produced MOSS agreements in sectors such as tele-
communications, medical equipment/pharmaceuticals, electronics, forestry products
and transportation machinery. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
U.S.-JAPAN TRADE: TRADE DATA AND INDUSTRY ViEWS ON MOSS AGREEMENTS
(Feb.1988); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-JAPAN TRADE:
EVALUATION OF THE MARKET-ORIENTED SECTOR-SELECTIVE TALKS (July 1988).
10. Generically, semiconductors are any material with properties of both a con-
ductor and an insulator, often enclosed in silicon. The specific trade dispute between
the United States and Japan centered on EPROM and DRAM semiconductor chips.
EPROM, Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory, chips permit the storage of
frequently used information that the user may erase and replace with new information
when necessary. DRAM, Dynamic Random Access Memory, chips store digital infor-
mation that can be changed by the user and constitute the basic storage element in a
computer.
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linked gradually, but increasingly, to the international trading system.
In aggregate terms, U.S. export dependence has grown from about five
percent in the late 1950's to twenty percent in 1980. United States
import dependence has followed a similar course. 1'
Second, trade policymaking in Congress and the Executive has be-
come increasingly democratized and linked more closely with domestic
constituencies. Historically, trade policymaking in Congress has been
the virtually exclusive province of the Senate Finance and House Ways
and Means Committees and, more particularly, their powerful chair-
men. Recently, however, the proliferation of trade policy issues and the
diffusion of jurisdiction over such issues have reached unprecedented
proportions. During the 100th Congress, more than a dozen committees
shared jurisdiction over trade and competitiveness legislation in the
Senate and a similar number of committees shared jurisdiction in the
House. 2 The current trade bill has required a conference committee
composed of nearly 200 members of Congress." In the executive
branch, trade policymaking is also decentralized. Although the actual
players vary with the issue, the key executive players often include the
Treasury, Commerce, State, Agriculture, and Labor Departments, the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Council of Economic
Advisors. 4
Third, since the mid-1930's, executive department strength and in-
itiative in conducting U.S. trade policy has grown steadily and has con-
stituted a bulwark for free trade norms. As discussed with great sub-
tlety in the works of I.M. Destler' 5 and Robert Pastor,'" the executive
branch has successfully held at bay repeated congressional attempts to
fashion protectionist legislation in response to the-demands of particu-
I11. Export dependence measures industrial exports as a percentage of total do-
mestic industrial production. Import dependence measures industrial imports as a per-
centage of total domestic consumption. I REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION 36 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-48, 101 Stat. 931 (1987).
13. Id.
14. In addition to these agencies and departments, the Reagan Administration's
cabinet-level Trade Policy Committee which coordinates interagency policy-making in
international trade matters includes the Defense, Interior, Transportation, and Energy
Departments, the Attorney General's Office, the Office of Management and Budget,
the National Security Council and the International Development Cooperation Agency.
15. See AMERICAN TRADE POLICY UNDER STRESS (Institute for International Ec-
onomics 1986); MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY (Brookings Institution 1980).
16. See The Cry-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy, in Making Ec-
onomic Policy in Congress (A. Schick ed. 1983); CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1929-1976 (1980).
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lar industrial sectors and labor groups hard hit by foreign competition.
The domestic politics of trade is characterized by Destler as "protec-
tion for Congress." By this characterization, Destler means a tacit un-
derstanding between the branches whereby the Executive or executive
agencies respond to and abate congressional demands for protection for
politically important groups by fashioning partial relief from fairly or
unfairly traded imports in exchange for a congressional delegation of
authority and support for American-sponsored and Executive-negoti-
ated international free trade. In short, Congress makes noise, the Exec-
utive accepts the political heat; a special deal is struck for special cases
when necessary, most often through relatively depoliticized administra-
tive remedies;17 and the specter of congressional protectionism recedes.
Finally, American trade policy has reflected a movement away
from high tariff protection embodied in the Smoot-Hawley tariff of
1930 to a liberal trading system based on diffuse reciprocity and multi-
lateral mechanisms embodied in the GATT and its institutions.18 A be-
lief in the advantages of liberal free trade was the hard-won lesson of
the Smoot-Hawley tariff.19 The first significant domestic manifestation
of liberal free trade ideology was a series of bilateral initiatives carried
out under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act"). 20 The 1934 Act set the course for modern trade policymaking. It
provided a delegation of constitutional authority from the Congress to
the President to declare reductions in U.S. tariffs by as much as fifty
percent in return for equivalent concessions from other governments;21
it did so, however, on a very short string of three years. Presidential
tariff reduction authority has been periodically renewed by Congress
17. U.S. trade law offers a host of remedies to import impacted domestic indus-
tries, if certain conditions are met. The focus of the statutes vary as does the standard
of injury that must be proven and the nature and certainty of relief. Regarding the
politicization of administrative trade remedies, compare Ehrenhaft, The Judicializa-
tion of Trade Law, 56 THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER, Apr. 1981, at 595. with Finger,
Hall & Nelson, The Political Economy of Administered Protection, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 452 (1982).
18. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 10-11 (1970).
19. Judith Goldstein in a recent article noted how prevailing U.S. free-trade insti-
tutions can be traced to the experience of the Great Depression. Goldstein, The Politi-
cal Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection, 80 AM. POLl. Sc. R. 161 (1986).
20. See I.M DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 1
(1986).
21. In the 11 years following enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934, a series of bilateral negotiations with major U.S. trading partners succeeded in
reducing the average Smoot-Hawley tariff by about one-third. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 27 (1987).
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since that time, usually for three to five years, sometimes for shorter
periods.22
Following World War II, multilateralism also became a corner-
stone of U.S. trade policy. In 1947, the United States and twenty-two
other nations signed the GATT, an agreement consisting of a code of
tariff practices together with schedules of tariff concessions on more
than 45,000 items accounting for more than one-half of world trade.2"
In replacing bilateral trade negotiations, the GATT institutionalized on
a multilateral basis the principle of nondiscrimination in trade barrier
reductions on a most-favored-nation ("MFN") basis.24 MFN obliges
each member of the GATT to treat other GATT members at least as
well as it treats any other country with regard to imports and exports.25
In the early years of the GATT, the United States tolerated discrimi-
nation against the access of U.S. products to the Japanese and fledgling
European Community markets on grounds of aiding their rapid post-
war recovery and the political advantages of an integrated Europe and
a Western-leaning Japan."6
Equally essential to the operation of the multilateral trading sys-
tem is the GATT principle of reciprocity. Although not defined in the
GATT, reciprocity ensures that the outcome of negotiations leads to
roughly equivalent benefits in any final agreement concluded under
GATT auspices.2 7 The other key principles that underlie the GATT
include resolution of trade disputes through open and transparent con-
sultations, general elimination of quantitative restrictions, national
treatment (treating imported products of a member country the same
as domestic products with regard to internal taxation and regulation),
and giving compensation to affected countries for recision of a previ-
281 Sously granted tariff concession. United States import and trade policy
has generally followed this institutional framework and GATT rules
ever since."'
22. Id.
23. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY 45 (1975).
24. Id. at 17.
25. DAM, supra note 18, at 18-19.
26. For a discussion of concessions made by hegemonic economic powers see
Stein, The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the Interna-
tional Economic Order, 38 INT'L ORGANIZATION, Spring 1984, at 355.
27. Id. at 17.
28. id. at 17-22.
29. This statement is not meant to imply that certain U.S. trade policies have not
departed from GATT norms; most notable in this regard are the Multifiber Agreement
governing trade in textiles and apparel and voluntary export restraints, such as the
1988]
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III. ISSUE IMPORTANCE
How important an issue is the U.S. - Japan semiconductor dis-
pute? Why does this issue merit investigation? Any answer to these
questions is, admittedly, heuristic, rather than conclusive. Nonetheless,
one way of assessing an issue's importance is its interconnectedness to
actor states within the international system, particularly actors of con-
sequence to the system.30 In the case of semiconductors, the issue
linked the trading system's two preeminent economic powers.3 Also
implicated in the dispute were the European Community ("EC"), a
major consumer and a minor manufacturer; Korea, a consumer, emerg-
ing manufacturer, and assembler; and several nations in Latin America
and Asia that perform a variety of assembly operations.32
A second indication of importance of the dispute is the intensity
and degree of generality and abstraction with which key actors frame
the issue. 3 In the United States, semiconductor manufacturing capa-
bility and competitiveness have become synonymous with U.S. indus-
trial health. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has
stated that "it is probably not an exaggeration to say that the semicon-
ductor industry and particularly the application of a semiconductor
manufacturing technology, are now the future of an advanced indus-
trial economy."3 4 This assertion is, in considerable measure, based in
fact. Semiconductors are integral to the electronics industry which ac-
counted for $250 billion in 1986 or fifteen percent of U.S. industrial
output.35 Some estimate that by the year 2000, the semiconductor-de-
pendent sector of the U.S. economy will account for twenty-five percent
of gross national product.3e
Competitiveness in this sector is also viewed as integral to U.S.
U.S. - Japan agreement on automobile imports from Japan.
30. Robert Randle has identified this connectivity factor as one indicia of issue
importance. See RANDLE, supra note 4, at 2.
31. TIMOTHY J.C. O'SHEA, THE U.S.-JAPAN SEMICONDUCTOR PROBLEM 22 (1988).
32. Borrus, Millstein & Zysman, Trade and Development in the Semiconductor
Industry: Japanese Challenge and American Response, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL COMPETITION 174 (J. Zysman & L. Tyson eds. 1983).
33. Id. at 3.
34. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. INDUSTRIAL COM-
PETITIVENESS: A COMPARISON OF STEEL, ELECTRONICS AND AUTOMOBILES 103-04
(July 1981); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC TRANSITION: CHOICE FOR THE FUTURE (May 1987). See
also Borrus, Millstein & Zysman, supra note 32, at 143, 149.
35. Dallmeyer, National Security and the Semiconductor Industry, TECHNOLOGY
R., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 48.
36. See id. at 55.
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national security. In a cost-benefit analysis of federally funding a semi-
conductor research consortium, the Congressional Budget Office sum-
marized the national security implications of semiconductor manufac-
turing competitiveness as follows:
U.S. military strategy relies on having fewer, but technologically
more advanced, weapons than the Soviet Union. The concern of
military planners is that deterioration of U.S. semiconductor pro-
ducers could soon lead either to dependence on foreign sources for
components for sophisticated weapons systems, or to a decline in
the technological base needed to develop and use these
components.3 7
Perhaps the most telling example of this national security concern was
the interest the U.S. government took in the announcement by Fujitsu,
the Japanese multinational corporation, of an "agreement in principle"
with Fairchild Semiconductor, an American company owned by a
French parent, to merge Fujitsu's U.S. and European semiconductor
operations with Fairchild's. 38 The proposal raised immediate concerns
among industry officials, Congress, and the Executive, 39 The proposal
prompted a review by the interagency Committee of Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States ("CFIUS").'0 Neither CFIUS, nor the Pres-
ident pursuant to its recommendation, has legal authority to bar take-
overs, but a negative recommendation usually acts to discourage a
proposed takeover." When it became clear that Secretary of Com-
merce Malcolm Baldridge and Secretary of Defense Casper Wein-
berger would oppose the deal, Fujitsu withdrew its offer.' 2 Six months
later, National Semiconductor, an American firm, purchased Fairchild
for $122 million.' 3
Another indication of the perceived industrial and strategic impor-
tance of the semiconductor industry was the formation of a joint gov-
ernment-industry semiconductor manufacturing consortium." At the
end of 1986, the Semiconductor Industry Association ("SIA") released
37. U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BENEFITS AND RISKS
OF FEDERAL FUNDING FOR SEMATECH (Sept.1987).
38. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) L-3 (Jan. 22, 1987).
39. Id.
40. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4.
41. Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1986, at El col. 1.
42. Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1987, at 3.
43. Dallmeyer, supra note 35, at 48.
44. Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1987, at El.
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word that it was developing a plan for the creation of a semiconductor
manufacturing consortium to promote the competitiveness of the U.S.
industry.45 The SIA consortium, code-named "Sematech," would be
partially funded by government agencies." In January, 1987, the Presi-
dent announced a budget proposal to fund Sematech.4 7 The President's
budget proposal for fiscal year ("FY") 1988 included a $50 million
request for the Defense Semiconductor Initiative, the government coun-
terpart to Sematech.48 The Department of Defense ("DOD") planned
to call for another $49 million to fund the proposal in FY 1989."' The
$50 million request was only one-fifth of the $250 million per year rec-
ommended by the Defense Science Board ("DSB"), a task force com-
posed of military, business, and academic representatives that evalu-
ated the present extent and strategic implications of U.S. dependence
on foreign semiconductor suppliers." DOD officials reported that full
funding of the DSB recommendation was impossible because of budget
constraints. 1
Despite the reservations of Commerce Department Secretary Mal-
colm Baldridge, DOD and industry representatives launched a public
campaign on behalf of Sematech in 1987." By March, 1987, SIA had
decided that its Sematech consortium would be a low-volume produc-
tion facility dedicated primarily to the development of advanced manu-
facturing technologies.5 3 Equipment and techniques developed in the
facility would be transferred back to the member companies.54 The
House Energy and Commerce Committee subsequently amended the
pending omnibus trade legislation to authorize $100 million per year in
government funding for Sematech over the next five years. 5
The semiconductor dispute also became the test case for the
American response to the general problem of domestic economic dislo-
cations attributable, in part, to foreign states' "export targeting" of in-
dustrial sectors.56 "Export targeting" is a term that is applied to a host
45. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 9.
46. Id.
47. Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 30, 1987, at 2.
48. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at D1 col. 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. AVIATION WK. AND SPACE TECH., May 18, 1987, at 24.
53. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 352 (March 11, 1987).
54. Id.
55. Inside U.S. Trade, Apr. 3, 1987, at 8.
56. In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Section 625), Congress mandated that
the Executive undertake a study of targeting. See An Analysis of the Effects of
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of government policies and practices which have the combined effect of
making an industry more competitive than it otherwise would be in the
absence of such practices."' Targeting of the Japanese semiconductor
industry is generally thought to have included 1) the closing of Japan's
home market by the government to guarantee its domestic producers a
significant market and premium prices; 2) resource transfers to the in-
dustry through subsidies, discriminatory government procurement,
forced specialization, et cetera; and 3) encouraging export markets for
growth of a maturing industry and as an outlet for domestic
overproduction."
Furthermore, the dispute has become a harbinger of future U.S.-
Japan economic relations. The dispute and the subsequent decision by
the Administration to retaliate with punitive tariffs for Japan's alleged
failure to comply with a pricing and market access agreement, 59 the
first sanction of its kind imposed against Japan since World War II,
may carry implications for the future of U.S.-Japan trade relations.
Generally, the dispute served to draw down the large reservoir of
friendship and goodwill which has nurtured U.S.-Japan relations in the
post-War period. The dispute reflected a widespread belief held by U.S.
policymakers that Japan's market is closed, not because of formal bar-
riers, but because Japan's economic system and, indeed, its culture dis-
criminates against imports."
The issue clearly contributed to a growing feeling that behind a
facade of reasonableness and cooperation in multilateral and bilateral
economic discussions, Japan is, in fact, embarked on an aggressive and
mercantilist trade policy designed to achieve economic dominance, par-
ticularly in high technology products. 1 Because its exports continue to
grow while its imports stagnate, despite a long series of market-opening
commitments, many U.S. officials have come to discount undertakings
by the Japanese government and even to regard the Japanese as un-
Targeting on the Competitiveness of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry (Nat. Tech.
Info. Serv. Doc. No. PB85-213270). The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade has continued to explore this issue, holding hearings on February 19, 1987, and
the pending Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness bill would amend section 301 of the
trade laws to explicitly include foreign export targeting as an actionable unfair trade
practice.
57. See Borrus, Millstein, & Zysman, supra note 32, at 181-217.
58. Id.
59. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 1-4 (Mar. 30, 1987).
60. Author's Interview Data (1988).
61. See generally Krasner, Trade Conflicts and the Common Defense: The United
States and Japan, 101 POLl. SC. Q. 787 (1986).
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trustworthy and manipulative.6"
It would go too far to say that the semiconductor dispute and U.S.
sanctions reflect the wholesale adoption of such a viewpoint. It should
be remembered that the issue came to a head at the time President
Reagan was under siege over the Iran-Contra affair and when the U.S.
Congress, having only recently come fully under Democratic control,
was actively considering protectionist trade legislation. Under such cir-
cumstances, the President and his key advisors were faced with an ex-
tremely difficult choice. The imposition of trade sanctions against an
ally may have been unpalatable to some in the Administration, but a
refusal to do so in the face of the Commerce Department's well-publi-
cized findings that the agreement had been violated, coupled with the
overwhelming chorus of demands for retaliation from members of Con-
gress, would have undercut the Administration's influence in removing
or modifying protectionist provisions in the pending trade legislation. In
this situation, the imposition of limited sanctions may have been viewed
as a prudent, if exceptional, course of action. Nonetheless, the enor-
mous and persistent trade deficit between the two countries continues
to threaten future economic relations and will both engender U.S. sus-
picions of Japanese trading practices and subject future administrations
to similar pressures.
As one might expect with issues of such general significance, the
semiconductor dispute has spawned several other trade issues, another
measure of issue importance. For example, the suspicions raised over
Japanese export targeting of semiconductor manufacturing prodded the
U.S. government to investigate and begin negotiations with Japan over
supercomputer procurement practices.6" Furthermore, the semiconduc-
tor agreement ultimately reached and the sanctions imposed by the
U.S. government for Japan's alleged failure to fulfill the agreement
have also created a variety of subissues."'
62. Author's Interview Data (1988).
63. On August 7, 1987, the United States Trade Representative's Office an-
nounced that Japan will implement regulations to make it easier for U.S. supercom-
puter companies to bid for Japanese government contacts. The related issue of Japa-
nese supercomputer company pricing practices remains unresolved. In a continuing
resolution providing funds to operate the federal government during the fiscal year
1988, Congress, in expressing this concern, prohibited the Defense Department from
purchasing foreign-made supercomputers by denying funds to an important U.S. Army
water project if any Defense Department agency purchases a foreign (Japanese)
supercomputer.
64. One example of a follow-on issue concerned the 1986 U.S. Customs Service
reclassification of imported circuit boards with 16-bit or larger central processing units
("CPUs) and imported peripheral circuit boards with logic capability as "complete
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IV. ORIGINS OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR DISPUTE
Although an American monopoly for over two decades, by the
1970's Japanese semiconductor manufacturers had emerged as strong
international competitors.6" American manufacturers alleged that the
strength of the Japanese industry was the direct product of a national
strategy that protected and promoted the long-term development and
international competitiveness of this industry. 0 According to some ana-
lysts, Japan's state-sponsored policies controlled domestic competition
among component and final systems manufacturers, thereby cushioning
the Japanese producers from market forces and American competition
and encouraging Japanese export penetration of the U.S. market."7
As early as the mid 1970's, American manufacturers had leveled
complaints against Japan's protected home market, its procurement
practices, and its vertically integrated manufacturers.68 These dissatis-
factions peaked during the slump in the computer industry during 1984
and 1985.69 Both domestic and foreign semiconductor manufacturers
had incorrectly anticipated a boom in demand for their products. The
result was an excess supply of chips and excess manufacturing capac-
ity. Prices fell accordingly. U.S. companies lost more than $2 billion,
and 50,000 employees were laid off in the U.S. semiconductor industry
as a result of the slump during 1985 and 1986.70
V. ISSUE EVOLUTION: CRISIS
The beleaguered U.S. semiconductor industry launched a legal at-
tack on the Japanese industry in June, 1985. In that month, the Japa-
nese industry became the target of two unfair trade complaints brought
data processing equipment" subject to 3.9 percent and 3.7 percent tariffs, respectively.
This relatively arcane and seemingly innocuous Custom ruling had the important com-
mercial effect of subjecting CPUs from Japan, when incorporated into a stand-alone
drive, to the 100 percent punitive tariff imposed on certain Japanese computers for
failure to satisfy the terms of the U.S. -Japan semiconductor agreement. The decision
became the subject of intense importer lobbying and inter-agency dispute.
65. Since 1978, Japan has increased its share of the global semiconductor market
from 28 to 50 percent, while the U.S. share has fallen from 55 to 44 percent. The
figures are even more startling in mass-produced chips. in 1975, U.S. companies con-
trolled 90 percent of the world market for DRAM chips. By 1986, that figure had
tumbled to five percent.
66. See Borrus, Millstein, & Zysman, supra note 32, at 146-49.
67. Id. at 142-50.
68. Dallmeyer, supra note 35, at 47.
69. id.
70. Id. at 55.
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on behalf of the U.S. industry. The first was filed with the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") by the SIA under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974. 7 The second was an antidumping action filed
with the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commis-
sion ("ITC") one week later by Micron Technology.7 2
The SIA petition asserted that a number of structural elements in
the Japanese semiconductor market, taken together, operate as "unrea-
sonable" barriers to U.S. sales, and these elements have resulted from
policies of the Japanese government.7 3 The petition also asserted that
the Japanese market barriers are inconsistent with U.S. rights under
the GATT and with Japanese commitments made in 1983 to promote
enhanced sales opportunities for U.S. companies in Japan.74
The petition pointed to two sets of trade figures that, in combina-
tion with Japan's "protectionist heritage in micro-electronics," alleg-
edly reveal the closed nature of the Japanese market. The first set of
figures involved the U.S. percentage of the Japanese market, which va-
ried little between 1973 at nine percent and 1984 at 11.4 percent, de-
spite the phasing out of quotas, prior approval requirements, and most
other formal restrictions between 1970 and 1975.7 ' The second set of
figures involved the respective market shares for U.S. and Japanese
manufacturers in various parts of the world, which reveal that, al-
though Japanese companies outsell U.S. producers by a nine to one
margin in Japan, the relationship is largely reversed in "neutral" third
country markets where U.S. and Japanese firms compete.76
The petition used these two sets of figures along with suggestions
71. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 807 (June 19, 1985). Chapter 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), gives the President broad authority to impose trade restric-
tions in response to "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory" practices by for-
eign governments that burden or restrict the international commerce of the United
States.
72. The antidumping law, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), affords a
domestic industry compensatory tariff relief from injurious imports sold in the U.S.
market either below their home market price or below the cost of production.
73. The petition identified the following structural elements as Japanese barriers
to U.S. semiconductor sales: 1) the domination of most major semiconductor end use
markets by Japanese companies; 2) the domination by these same companies of Japa-
nese semiconductor production; 3) the procurement of semiconductors by these Japa-
nese producer-consumers primarily from each other; 4) the linkage of these Japanese
producer-consumers by multiple horizontal ties (particularly in research and develop-
ment); and 5) the "Buy Japan" attitude characterizing these Japanese producer-
consumers.
74. SIA press conference, June 14, 1985.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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that U.S. manufacturers have made major sales efforts in Japan to ar-
gue that the Japanese government essentially replaced formal trade
barriers with a strategy of more subtle barriers in the 1970's; there
"liberalization countermeasures" have served to relegate U.S. produc-
ers to the role of residual suppliers.77 The petition argued that this al-
leged fostering by the Japanese government of a large, protected Japa-
nese market has provided Japanese producers with a secure demand
base and contributed to an intensive expansion of production capacity
with little reference to market conditions, a phenomenon that has alleg-
edly culminated in repeated surges of low-priced Japanese semiconduc-
tors onto the world market at times of excess production. 8
Despite these assertions of "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory" Japanese practices and the broad powers given to the
President under section 301, the petition did not request import restric-
tions against Japanese products. Rather, it requested negotiations with
the Japanese government aimed at two main goals: 1) a dramatic im-
provement in U.S. sales in Japan "within a short time, commensurate
with the demonstrated competitiveness of U.S. products in other world
markets," with an interim goal of equating the U.S. share of the Japa-
nese market with the Japanese share of the U.S. market by 1986;19 and
2) prevention of "potential Japanese dumping" of semiconductors in
the U.S. market. 80
U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter announced on July 11,
1985, that he had decided to initiate an investigation into Japanese
"market barriers" in the industry in response to the SIA petition.
Under the Trade Act of 1974, the USTR had a year from the date the
investigation was formally initiated, July 11, to recommend to the Pres-
ident what action he should take.81 After the President received
USTR's recommendation, he had twenty-one days in which to deter-
mine what action he would take under section 301.82
When SIA filed its petition, spokesmen for SIA noted that its
members were considering antidumping petitions against the Japanese
industry, particularly given the alleged prevalence of below-cost sales
77. 2 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 71, at 807-08. SIA charged that the Japanese
firms bought chips primarily from one another, thus relegating U.S. firms to secondary
or residual suppliers.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 921 (July 17, 1985).
82. Id.
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by Japanese companies in the current market.83 SIA was preempted,
however, when Micron Technology filed an antidumping petition cover-
ing 64K DRAMs on June 21, 1985.84 The petition alleged that, since
October, 1984, Japanese manufacturers of 64K DRAMs dropped their
prices for sales both in Japan and in the United States to a point where
they were well below cost of production.8 5 Based on constructed costs
for Japanese manufacturers and a statutory minimum profit of eight
percent, the petition alleged a dumping margin of ninety-four percent
on Japanese "less-than-fair-value" sales in the United States.86
The petition also asserted that, as a result of Japanese practices,
market prices had been severely depressed for 64K DRAMs, and the
U.S. industry had suffered substantial layoffs, loss of profits, and other
material injury.87 According to the petition, absent relief, such injury
would continue, and Japanese manufacturers would obtain substantial
technological advantages from their production experience, ultimately
capturing up to ninety percent of the DRAM market. 8
The Commerce Department announced on July 15, 1985, that it
was initiating an investigation of possible "less-than-fair-value sales" of
64K DRAMs in response to Micron Technology's petition, setting the
stage for a preliminary determination on August 8, 1985, by the ITC
as to whether or not imports of Japanese 64K DRAMs were causing
material injury to a U.S. industry.89
Before administrative findings on either the dumping or section
301 investigation, Congress lent its wholehearted support to the domes-
tic industry's cause. On July 30, the Senate Banking Subcommittee on
International Finance and Monetary Policy held a hearing to examine
industry complaints of restricted market access in Japan and allega-
tions of predatory Japanese marketing practices. 90 The remarks of the
subcommittee members revealed a consensus opinion that American
manufacturers face unfair and perhaps illegal competition from Japan,
and that "time is running out" and the U.S. must take swift and effec-
83. SIA press conference, June 14, 1985.
84. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 865 (July 3, 1985).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. id.
88. Id.
89. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 960 (July 24, 1985).
90. See Semiconductor Trade and Japanese Targeting, Hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Congress., ist Sess. 99-309 (July 30,
1985).
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tive action to counter it.91 Several senators described Japanese practices
in harsh terms and closed the hearing by agreeing that the U.S. indus-
try was in need of timely protection.92 Senator Reigle (D-Michigan)
noted that "the performance of the U.S. semiconductor industry will
profoundly affect the ability of all U.S. industries and workers to
regain and maintain their competitive edge."9 The administration
adopted a less belligerent line at the hearing, but one sympathetic to
the domestic industry.94
U.S. manufacturers launched another round of trade complaints
on September 30, 1985. InterCorporation, AMD, and National Semi-
conductor Corporation filed an antidumping complaint alleging injury
and loss of market share by virtue of below cost sales of EPROM chips
by Japanese manufacturers." The complaint alleged that Japanese
EPROMs which sold for $17 in January 1985 were being sold for $4 in
August 1985, despite a production cost estimated at $6.34 per chip.96
On December 6, the Reagan Administration initiated its own an-
tidumping case against Japanese manufacturers following a recommen-
dation from the cabinet-level "strike force" on trade. 97 The action was
nominally directed at Japanese 256K DRAMs, but U.S. officials stated
that a finding of dumping by the Commerce Department could lead to
duties on future generations of Japanese chips as well. 98 The launching
of the investigation resulted from continuing pressure by the U.S.
merchant industry.99
The virtually unprecedented self-initiation of an antidumping pro-
ceeding by the Commerce Department drew a sharply negative re-
sponse from the Japanese government and industry. The Administra-
tion move was termed "very regrettable" by Taizo Yokoyama,
Commercial Minister at the Japanese Embassy in Washington.0 " In
addition, the U.S. action reportedly drew strong criticism regarding its
handling from then U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Michael Mansfield,
91. Id. at 165.
92. Id. See statements by Senator Heinze, id. at 1-2; Senator Proxmire, at 2-7;
Senator Cranston, at 9-10; and Senator Reigle, at 99-103.
93. Id. at 99.
94. Id. See, for example, the testimony of James M. Murphy, Assistant United
States Trade Representative, and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Counselor to the Secretary of
Commerce for Japan Affairs. Id. at 96-98.
95. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1233 (Oct. 2, 1985).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1544 (Dec. 11. 1985).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Inside U.S. Trade, Dec. 13, 1985, at 10.
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and produced a strong lobbying effort against the inclusion of future
generation chips by representatives of Japanese interests, although
other quarters of the American government voiced little public
opposition.
On December 13, apparently in reaction to this pressure, a White
House aide made the unusual announcement that Commerce Secretary
Malcolm Baldridge had exceeded the authority given to him by the
President to initiate the investigation, by including in the investigation
not only 256K DRAMs, but future generation chips also."0 1 The White
House staff subsequently dropped its objections; however, at a Decem-
ber 16 meeting Baldridge strongly defended his legal authority to in-
clude future generation chips within the scope of the investigation.102
The U.S. merchant industry clearly and correctly viewed the Ad-
ministration move as a useful step in increasing pressure on the Japa-
nese to reach an acceptable accommodation. Alan Wolff, Washington
counsel for the SIA, welcomed the Commerce Department's "vigorous
action" against the alleged Japanese dumping of 256K DRAMs and
praised the Administration's emphasis on taking "preventative steps"
as well as remedying injuries. However, the Administration's move
drew a less positive response from U.S. captive producers and U.S. con-
suming interests, such as the computer industry.' 03
In the following weeks, the U.S. industry expanded its attack
against Japanese manufacturers and threatened still further legal pro-
ceedings if an "acceptable" resolution to the dispute was not reached
between the United States and Japanese governments.' 4 Following this
warning, the Administration indicated the possibility of other adminis-
trative proceedings against the Japanese industry. Commerce Depart-
ment Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration Paul Freedenberg
mentioned that there had been some industry interest in filing a peti-
tion for import relief on national security grounds under section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.0
The SIA had set out the basis for a possible section 232 action in a
paper on government procurement that highlighted the negative na-
tional security consequences of the declining U.S. manufacturing base.
In addition, the Defense Department publicly expressed growing con-
101. Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1985, at BI col. 1.
102. Id. Dec. 17, 1985, at E5 col. 1.
103. Inside U.S. Trade, Dec. 13, 1985, at 10.
104. See, e.g., id. Feb. 14, 1986, at 4.
105. The President is empowered, after an investigation by the Commerce Depart-
ment, to restrict the import of any items that "threaten to impair the national secur-
ity." See 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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cern over increased U.S. dependency on Japanese suppliers for semi-
conductor products, which play a key role in many defense systems.'06
As a result, the DSB began its evaluation of the national security im-
plications of a deterioration in domestic manufacturing, and the Na-
tional Security Council continued a parallel investigation."0 7
At the same time, the three antidumping proceedings against the
Japanese industry moved forward, and discussions continued between
the U.S. and Japanese governments regarding the SIA-generated sec-
tion 301 proceeding. By this time it was clear that the U.S. merchant
industry would not accept any settlement of the section 301 proceeding
that did not encompass Japanese worldwide pricing practices.'0 8 In this
regard, the USTR began considering a plan for extensive monitoring of
the pricing practices and costs of production of Japanese companies,
including the stationing in Japan of U.S. government industrial experts
trained in financial accounting, semiconductor manufacturing practices,
and the conduct of antidumping investigations. 1 9
By the end of March, 1986, government-to-government talks had
broken down, in large part over the question of greater access to the
Japanese market. Disagreements persisted on a pricing mechanism to
prevent Japanese dumping and on the pricing rules that would apply to
Japanese sales in third-country markets." 0 U.S. government 'negotia-
tors, while hesitant in principle to insist 'that the Japanese side guaran-
tee a specific market share and saddled with a potentially burdensome
pricing mechanism, basically supported the U.S. industry position."'
This stance was not wholly surprising, given congressional pressures," 2
the political realities of an election year, and the requirement for U.S.
industry cooperation in any termination of the legal proceedings." 3
In what can only be viewed as an extraordinary occurrence, the
Commerce Department accelerated its preliminary finding of dumping
106. Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 29, 1985, at 5.
107. Id. Nov. 28, 1986, at 1.
108. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 310-11 (Mar. 5, 1986).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 427-28 (Apr. 2, 1986).
I11. Id. at 428.
112. In this regard, it is interesting to note the March 27, 1986, letter from 53
Senators advising President Reagan of the widespread belief in Congress that Japan is
unwilling to assume the responsibilities of a world class economic power, and that any
trade bill emerging from Congress this year would be influenced by the state of U.S. -
Japan trade relations. The letter was signed by then Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-
Kansas) and then Trade Subcommittee Chairman John Danforth (R-Missouri).
113. Letter from Sens. R. Dole & J. Danforth to Pres. R. Reagan (Mar. 27,
1986) (discussing U.S. - Japan Trade relations).
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to increase pressure for a rapid settlement of the dispute." ' The Com-
merce Department announced preliminary dumping margins ranging
from 19.8 percent to 108.72 percent for DRAMs of 256K or above.1 15
In personally announcing the preliminary decision, Commerce Secre-
tary Malcolm Baldridge described the production and employment
losses in the U.S. industry and referred to the need to stop unfair trade
practices of the type encompassed in the proceeding.116
Pressure on Japanese and American negotiators for a resolution of
the dispute continued to increase in the Spring of 1986. In addition to
the 256K ruling in March, Commerce announced preliminary dumping
margins on EPROMs ranging from 21.7 percent to 188 percent.1 7 On
April 24, the Commerce Department announced its final determination
that 64K DRAMs were being dumped with margins ranging from
11.87 percent to 35.34 percent. 8 Final dumping determinations in the
EPROM and 256K DRAM proceedings were set for July 30, 1986,
and August 1, 1986, respectively, to coincide with the President's deci-
sion in the section 301 investigation.' 9
VI. ISSUE EVOLUTION: RESOLUTION
The United States and Japan reached agreement in principle on a
"broad accord" for resolving the semiconductor trade issue in May
1986.112 The agreement was announced shortly after a fourteen hour
negotiation session on May 28 between U.S. Trade Representative
Clayton Yuetter and Minister of International Trade and Industry
Michio Watanabe. 2' In a May 29 speech to the National Association
of Manufacturers, President Reagan hailed the agreement as one that
would "open Japanese markets to U.S. computer chips."' 22 It was
clear, however, that Yuetter and Watanabe had agreed only on the
broad outlines of a resolution to the dispute, and SIA, the American
Electronic Association, and the Electronics Industries Association de-
clined formal comment on the "framework" agreement until the imple-
menting details were worked out.1 3
114. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 19, 1986).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1,986, at 27.
118. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 577 (Apr. 30, 1986).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 735 (June 4, 1986).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Asian Wall St. Wkly, June 2, 1986, at 2.
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Under the Yuetter-Watanabe understanding, the Japanese govern-
ment reportedly committed itself to use its "best efforts" to achieve a
doubling by 1990 of U.S. sales in Japan, an estimated U.S. share in the
Japanese market of eighteen to twenty percent by 1990.124 The
mechanics of a purchase commitment were left to the follow-up negoti-
ations on "details." As for pricing, the Japanese government agreed to
a monitoring system that would determine and compare the costs of
production by Japanese semiconductor manufacturers and Japanese
selling prices.' 2 The system would be administered by the Commerce
Department in cooperation with the Japanese government.126
In exchange for the Japanese commitments, the U.S. government
agreed that it would end the section 301 proceeding, suspend the 256K
DRAM antidumping proceeding, and seek the petitioners' agreement
to a suspension of the EPROM and antidumping proceeding.127 Sepa-
rate U.S. floor prices would be negotiated with each of the Japanese
manufacturers, who would have to supply production costs and other
information to the Commerce Department.128
Time pressures for final resolution continued to build, however,
since final Commerce Department dumping determinations were due in
the EPROM and 256K, DRAM proceeding on July 30 and August 1,
respectively, and a USTR ruling in the section 301 proceeding was due
by July 11, with a presidential response by August 1.129 In June, 1986,
U.S. and Japanese negotiators failed to wrap up all of the details that
were left unresolved by the "framework" agreement.13 Nonetheless,
both sides agreed that substantial progress had been made, and the
Commerce Department initiated suspension agreements with Japanese
exporters in the EPROM and 256K DRAM antidumping
proceedings.1 31
Members of Congress and U.S. industry representatives sought to
maintain pressure on Japanese negotiators in the weeks immediately
before the July 31 deadline. Several key trade players on Capitol Hill,
including House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman
Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) and Finance Committee Chairman Robert
Packwood (R-Oregon), issued press statements threatening congres-
124. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 735 (June 4, 1986).
125. J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 29, 1987, at 6A.
126. Id.
127. J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 22, 1987, at 8A.
128. Id.
129. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 887 (July 9, 1986).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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sional action against Japan if the dispute was not resolved to U.S. satis-
faction. Industry representatives combined statements of cautious opti-
mism with threats of retaliation if necessary. A spokesman for SIA
indicated that they had accepted the suspension agreements as "an act
of good faith," but warned that SIA had not seen a draft text of the
overall accord and would pursue all available remedies if Japanese
negotiators were not forthcoming on the unresolved issues.132
Extended negotiations between the United States and Japan fi-
nally produced an agreement on July 31.133 The agreement came only
minutes before the Commerce Department's deadline for imposing
dumping duties of up to 100 percent on Japanese imports."" As de-
scribed by U.S. spokesmen at the time, the pact would take effect in
August, 1986, and run through July 31, 1991.1 s5 It focused primarily
on (1) increased access to the Japanese market for U.S. companies,
and (2) prevention of alleged Japanese dumping in the U.S. and third-
country markets.136
On the U.S. market access issue, the agreement was left deliber-
ately vague and envisioned only a "steady increase" in the U.S. share
of Japan's market over the five-year period. 137 The Reagan Administra-
tion, which widely advertised its free trade principles, felt that specify-
ing a particular market share for U.S. companies would contradict
those principles, while also raising sensitive antitrust concerns.' Both
sides, however, reached a clear understanding that the U.S. target was
twenty percent of the Japanese market by 1991."' This figure would
represent more than double the eight and one-half percent market
share held by U.S. firms in 1986 and would raise the dollar value of
U.S. sales in Japan by $2 billion. 4°
132. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 16 (Nov. 24, 1986).
133. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 994 (Aug. 6, 1986).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 995.
139. Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 5, 1986, at 5.
140. The Japanese government agreed to "encourage" Japanese producers and
users to purchase more American products by establishing an organization to assist
foreign producers by providing quality assessments, seminars, exhibitions, and the like.
The Japanese government agreed to foster long-term relationships between Japanese
semiconductor purchasers and U.S. manufacturers by promoting joint product develop-
ment efforts. According to press reports, Tokyo also agreed to offer the Japanese-based
facilities of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers all of the benefits traditionally provided
Japanese producers, such as government R&D grants, tax breaks, and subsidies.
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With regard to Japanese penetration of the U.S. market, the two
sides agreed on the following measures to prevent dumping. The De-
partment of Commerce would monitor cost and price data on imported
Japanese 256K DRAMs and EPROMs although the dumping investi-
gations into these chips were suspended.141 Japan's Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry ("MITI") would monitor cost and price data
for other semiconductor exports to the United States and to third-coun-
try markets using company and product-specific information supplied
by Japanese producers."4 "
The issue of Japanese dumping in third countries was not resolved
until late in the negotiations. U.S. negotiators insisted on provisions
covering Japan's third-country pricing practices, fearing that absent
such protection, efforts to prevent dumping in U.S. markets could eas-
ily be circumvented. 43 Although the agreement did not provide a de-
tailed solution, it contained a commitment by the Japanese government
to monitor the pricing of products exported to third countries.' 4
In return for these promised Japanese actions, the United States
agreed to suspend all three on-going cases: the 256K DRAM and
EPROM antidumping cases and the section 301 proceeding." 6 The
U.S. government reserved the right, however, to reinstate the two an-
tidumping proceeding if Japanese companies violate the agreement.4 6
In a practical sense, since all prior phases of the two antidumping pro-
ceedings had been completed, the U.S. could rapidly impose duty de-
posit requirements on 256K DRAM and EPROM chips at any time it
concluded that dumping had occurred." 7
The Administration effusively praised the pact. President Reagan
called it "a landmark pact," '18 and Commerce Secretary Baldrige said,
"[t]his has far-reaching consequences both for U.S. jobs and U.S. tech-
nology."" 9 Although pleased with the agreement, the U.S. industry of-
fered more restrained praise than did Administration spokesmen. The
SIA complimented the pact as opening the right path to a competitive
market, but cautioned that the agreement constituted "a point of de-
141. 3 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 129, at 995.
142. Id.
143. Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 14, 1986, at 8.
144. Id.
145. 3 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 129, at 995.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
149. Id.
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parture rather than a destination." 150 Members of Congress also ap-
plauded the pact, but Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob
Packwood (R-Oregon) warned that he intended to hold hearings within
six months to ensure that Japan was abiding by its terms..'"
U.S. negotiators were concerned that the Europeans might balk at
a bilateral pact on an item as important to worldwide industry and
commerce as the semiconductor. 52 To minimize such fears, the agree-
ment expressly provided that Japan's market-opening measures would
assist European, as well as American, producers. 53 However, these
steps were not enough to satisfy the EC. EC External Affairs Commis-
sioner Willy de Clercq and Industrial Affairs Commissioner Karl-
Heinz Narjes criticized the agreement as likely to cause "considerable"
repercussions on chip prices and on the entire EC industrial struc-
ture.154 They stated, "The commission cannot accept that Japan and
the U.S. determine prices on the basis of a bilateral understanding." '55
Press reports indicated that they were also concerned about discrimina-
tory market access in Japan, even though the Japanese market-opening
measures nominally would help Europeans as well as Americans.' 5
VII. ISSUE EVOLUTION: DENOUEMENT
The agreement between the United States and Japan on semicon-
ductor trade immediately created a major controversy both in the
United States and abroad. Japanese producers expressed concern that
the Commerce Department's high fair market value calculations would
exclude them from the American market.1 57 U.S. purchasers an-
nounced alarm about much higher chip prices; 5 8 and American pro-
ducers complained that the Japanese continued to dump chips in third
countries.' 59
The immediate result of the agreement was the establishment of
150. 3 Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 129, at 994.
151. Id.
152. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at D9, col. 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REMARKS OF MESSRS. DE
CLERCQ AND NARJES ON U.S./JAPAN AGREEMENT ON SEMICONDUCTORS (Information
Release No. IP(85) 385 Aug. 1, 1986).
156. Id.
157. Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 10 1986, at 10-11.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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fair market values ("FMVs") on Japanese chip imports to the U.S.1 0
In October, the Commerce Department revised downward the FMVs in
its first quarterly recalculation. 161 Because they are proprietary, the
FMVs were not publicly released by the Commerce Department, but
according to press reports the revised FMVs for 256K DRAMs ranged
from $2.50 to $5.00, with an average of about $3.25, compared to the
original FMVs of $2.50 to $8.70.162 Not everyone applauded the lower
prices. The original FMVs had effectively priced many Japanese com-
panies out of the U.S. market, and, despite the quarterly revisions,
many Japanese companies believed the FMVs were far too high for
their products to remain competitive in the U.S. market. 63
As noted, the EC's immediate reaction to the agreement was unfa-
vorable.16 4 The strong initial reaction did not diminish in the months
following the agreement, resulting in the filing of a protest in the
GATT and a request for formal consultations.16 5 DeClercq and Narjes
publicly argued that the agreement would cause "arbitrary increases"
in prices in the EC market and would provide privileged access for
American companies in Japan.16 Formal consultations were requested
to discuss claims that the agreement violated GATT rules.16 7 Despite
Japanese assurances to the contrary, the EC was concerned about pos-
sible side agreements that would increase U.S. exports to Japan at the
expense of European firms. 68
Although the SIA expressed continued support for the agreement
if it were properly enforced, computer manufacturers and other semi-
conductor purchasers were increasingly opposed to it. l"9 Immediately
after negotiation of the agreement, prices for some 256K DRAM chips
reportedly rose to more than double the pre-agreement price. 7 On
September 5, USTR and Commerce Department officials met with the
representatives of the American Electronics Association. 7 1 The meet-
160. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1986, at 8.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 17, 1986, at 12.
165. Id. Oct. 10, 1986, at 14.
166. Id. Oct. 17., 1986, at 12.
167. Although the U.S. and Japan successfully blocked EC efforts to have the
matter addressed at a March 4, 1987, GATT Council meeting, they were unable to
keep it off the agenda for the March 15 meeting.
168. Id.
169. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1986, at 1.
170. Id. Sept. 8, 1986, at 1.
171. Inside U.S. Trade, Sept. 5, 1986, at 6.
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ing was highly contentious, and industry spokesmen reportedly ex-
pressed "considerable pain" as a result of higher chip prices.' 72
Higher prices forced purchasers to use up much of their inventory
while waiting for prices to drop. It also prompted several computer
manufacturers to consider moving manufacturing facilities overseas,
where semiconductors would be less expensive to produce.'73 User
groups asserted that if the Commerce Department did not significantly
reduce Japanese FMVs in response to computer industry pressure and
new Japanese cost data, U.S. computer assembly lines would migrate
en masse to the Orient.1 74 Semiconductor purchaser trade groups such
as the Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association
("CBEMA"), began to mobilize to lobby Congress and the Adminis-
tration on this issue. 75
In the United States, semiconductor manufacturers' major concern
had been the possibility that Japanese pricing in third markets could
undercut the agreement. In an October 23 letter to Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator on the agree-
ment, the SIA charged that the Japanese were continuing to dump
their products in third country markets. 76 The letter also accused the
Japanese government of failing to enforce the agreement adequately."' 7
The letter warned that if corrective action were not taken by November
15, the SIA would recommend further action by the U.S. government,
including punitive duties assessed against particular manufacturers. 78
Neither the American nor the Japanese governments commented pub-
licly on the charges in the letter. However, the SIA allegations were
discussed in U.S.-Japan monitoring consultations.79
By November, U.S. and Japanese negotiators were working fever-
ishly to prevent the collapse of the agreement. In response to U.S. de-
mands, the Japanese government agreed to request that Japanese man-
ufacturers end sales at less than fair value in third-country markets. 8 '
In the United States, the Administration attempted to satisfy both pro-
ducers and users. In response to user complaints, it sharply reduced the
price floors for the fourth quarter of 1986. U.S. Trade Representative
172. Id. Sept. 19, 1986, at 1.
173. Id. Feb. 2, 1986, at 1.
174. Id.
175. ELECTRONIC NEWS, Sept. 15, 1986, at.6.
176. Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 31, 1986, at 1.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 6.
179. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at D6, col. 1.
180. Daily Tax Reports (BNA) L-6 (Nov. 24, 1986).
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Clayton Yeutter announced, however, that these price floors would re-
main above the prevailing market rates in third countries. On behalf of
U.S. manufacturers, the Administration demanded that MITI begin
enforcing price floors on all sales of Japanese chips."8 ' MITI responded
that its authority to use export controls and administrative guidance to
prevent third-country dumping was limited, and that it needed more
time to improve its monitoring of chip exports.1 82
U.S. negotiators agreed to give MITI until mid-December, 1986,
to produce results on third-country dumping.18 3 Failure by Japan to
meet that deadline could be grounds for quick U.S. retaliation and pos-
sible renunciation of the entire agreement. By late November, Japanese
producers had begun to respond to U.S. threats by raising their chip
prices in global markets.
In early January, 1987, Commerce Department Undersecretary
for International Trade, Bruce Smart, and Deputy U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, Michael Smith, travelled to Japan for bilateral talks on semi-
conductors.1 s' The U.S. negotiators expressed their concern over al-
leged continued Japanese dumping in third countries, primarily in the
Asia-Pacific market.185 They reportedly presented detailed evidence
that Hitachi, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and NEC chips were sold at prices up to
fifty percent below the foreign market values established pursuant to
the agreement. " Undersecretary Smart asserted that the Japanese had
been "unwilling or unable ...to fully implement Japan's side of the
agreement."' 87 Smart's statements were clearly at odds with Japanese
comments. MITI's Vice Minister for International Affairs Mokoto
Kuroda said monitoring by MITI showed no evidence of dumping, but
agreed to investigate the charges further.188
U.S. negotiators privately admitted that there were other concerns
of equal or greater importance than third-country dumping, which had
not received as much public attention. 89 Those concerns included the
U.S. producers' constant or declining share of the Japanese market and
the high volume of Japanese chips which were entering the U.S. via the
"grey market" at prices well below the Commerce Department's floor
181. Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 21.
182. Id.
183. Wall St. J., Nov. 31, 1986, at 4.
184. J. OF COMMERCE, Nov. 29, 1987, at 34.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Inside U.S. Trade, Feb. 6, 1987, at 2.
188. J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 29, 1987, at 6A.
189. WASH. TRADE AND TARIFF LETTER, Jan. 19, 1987, at 2.
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prices.190 In an effort to increase the pressure on the Japanese, Smart
and Smith called for immediate resolution of these problems and
threatened to retaliate if appropriate steps were not taken soon."'
As retaliatory measures, the SIA urged the U.S. government to
consider imposing duties or even a quota on either Japanese semicon-
ductors or Japanese computers and other products incorporating such
semiconductors."9 2 The quota option was suggested rather quietly, how-
ever, because it was strongly opposed by semiconductor users. Officials
of CBEMA said they would adamantly oppose any such quota and did
not believe any responsible U.S. government official would support it.193
In response, manufacturers focused on sanctions in the form of tariffs
or quotas on consumer electronic goods produced by Japanese semicon-
ductor manufacturers for which Korean and other low-cost substitutes
were available to U.S. consumers. 94 A schedule was designed to in-
crease tariffs if violations continued. 95
Ultimately, the Administration's Economic Policy Council, chaired
by Treasury Secretary James Baker, was charged with determining
what sanctions to impose if U.S. demands were not met.' 96 Deputy
USTR Michael Smith warned that penalties could be imposed as
quickly as mid-March. 97
On March 27, the President decided to retaliate for Japan's al-
leged violation of the agreement by imposing tariffs valued at $300 mil-
lion on Japanese imports. 98 The President's action was broadly sup-
ported by members of Congress from both parties and by U.S.
industry.' 99 On the unanimous recommendation of his Economic Policy
Council, the President authorized the imposition of 100 percent ad
valorem duties on ninteen designated products exported by Japanese
manufacturers. 00 From this list, representing over. $1 billion in Japa-
nese exports, USTR later selected products representing $300 million
worth of exports for actual imposition of duties.2 ' The final list was
announced on April 17, after a public hearing on April 13 for the pur-
190. Id.
191. J. OF COMMERCE, supra note 184.
192. Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1987, at 2.
193. Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 23, 1987, at 7.
194. Wall St. J., supra note 183.
195. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 191 (Feb. 11, 1987).
196. J. OF COMMERCE, Mar. 27, 1987, at 21.
197. WASH. TRADE AND TARIFF LETTER, Mar. 16, 1987, at 1.
198. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) L-4 (Mar. 30, 1987).
199. Id. at L-5.
200. Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at A2, col. 1.
201. Id. Feb. 28, 1987, at A13, col. 1.
SEMICONDUCTOR DISPUTE
pose of identifying those products whose inclusion would cause the least
hardship to U.S. economic interests." 2
Of the $300 million in proposed sanctions, approximately $135
million was attributed to damage from alleged dumping by Japanese
firms in third countries, with the remaining $165 million due to unsat-
isfactory U.S. market access in Japan.20 3 Administration officials
stressed that the sanctions would end only when actual sales data
demonstrated that the alleged third-country dumping had ceased and
that U.S. market share in Japan had begun to move upward signifi-
cantly toward the twenty percent goal.20 4
President Reagan partially lifted sanctions against Japan during
the Venice Economic Summit in June, 1987.205 He reduced sanctions
by $51 million when he lifted the 100 percent punitive tariff on twenty-
inch color television sets, relying on data that third-country dumping of
DRAMs had declined. 0 SIA, while supporting the partial lifting of
sanctions in June and MITI's authorization of increased DRAM pro-
duction, did not support any further lifting of sanctions before several
additional months of improved U.S. chip sales in Japan.207
The Administration was not prepared to lift another $165 million
worth of sanctions imposed in March as compensation for the contin-
ued low Japanese market share of U.S. manufacturers. Undersecretary
Smart found that U.S. penetration was below expectations,20 8 while the
SIA announced the U.S. share of the Japanese market had increased
one-half percent to nine percent in the second quarter of 1987.209 SIA
had expected an eleven percent market share by that time.210
In August, the Commerce Department adopted Japan's method of
calculating fair market value for the sale of semiconductors in third-
country markets. Because the Japanese method examines cost of pro-
duction in third countries as well as in the United States, its use re-
202. Id. April 18, 1987, at A12, col. 1.
203. Daily Tax Rep., supra note 198, at L-5.
204. Id. at L-8.
205. White House Press Release, Statement by the President, June 8, 1987.
206. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
207. Id. Because Commerce Undersecretary Bruce Smart expected the latest data
to demonstrate that third-country dumping had decreased further, he was prepared at
that time to recommend that the President lift some of the remaining sanctions in the
near future. The U.S. Trade Representative, on the other hand, recommended that
sanctions be continued to avoid difficulties with Congress during the trade bill negotia-
tions. Id.
208. Inside U.S. Trade, Aug. 28, 1987, at 3.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id.
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duced, and may have in some cases entirely eliminated, dumping mar-
gins. As a result, President Reagan decreased by a commensurate
amount the value of outstanding sanctions; $84 millon, related to al-
leged Japanese dumping in third-country markets on November 4.211
The decision was viewed in part as a demonstration of goodwill toward
Japan's new Prime Minister, Noburu Takeshita. Remaining in place
were duties attributed to the failure of American chip producers to in-
crease their share of the Japanese market.2"2
U.S. penetration of the Japanese market was estimated at nine
percent for the second quarter of 1987, lower than the level in June,
1985, when the dispute began.213 In early January 1988, Deputy USTR
Smith informed officials of Japan's MITI that the United States con-
sidered Japanese efforts to increase the foreign share of Japan's market
to be insufficient.21 He indicated that remaining U.S. sanctions would
not be lifted until the U.S. share of Japan's chip market increased in
accordance with the 1986 agreement.215
VIII. CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT
An assessment of any one issue, however important, does not per-
mit one to reach conclusions with the same level of certainty that a
systematic assessment of several issues might afford. Any one example
could be countered or qualified by other examples while the cumulative
trend of issue resolutions remains uncertain. Nonetheless, the semicon-
ductor issue offers insights of potential importance to the future course
of both U.S. trade policy and the international trading system.
A. U.S. Trade Policy
Some analysts have argued that in the United States, trade law is
trade policy.2 16 Although somewhat overstated, the trade laws have
been used as the primary vehicle for raising and prosecuting the U.S.
semiconductor industry's concerns. Before the dispute, the laws were a
means of diverting political pressure for protection to technical, admin-
istrative bodies where a form of circumscribed relief might be ob-
211. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1382 (Nov. II, 1987).
212. Id. at 1383.
213. Inside U.S. Trade, Aug. 27, 1987, at 4.
214. Id. Jan. 15, 1988, at 6.
215. Id.
216. See Howell & Wolff, The Role of Trade Law in the Making of Trade Pol-
icy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE §§ 3.01-.06 (J.
Jackson, R. Cunningham, & C. Fontheim eds. 1985).
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tained,2 17 while leaving an open free trade system essentially intact. 218
Analysts of U.S. trade policy have noted that politically powerful but
economically uncompetitive industries have used these laws as a means
of striking special deals.2 19 I.M. Destler argues that "in large cases,
'the rules' change from a means of diverting pressure to a means of
asserting it. Typically, the policy result was not the remedy specified in
law but new 'special case' protection for the claimants. 220
In some measure, this analysis encompasses the semiconductor dis-
pute. The dispute resulted in a special deal for a special case in much
the way special forms of relief were crafted for the U.S. textile and
steel industries.2 In many other important respects, however, this
traditional analysis fails to capture its unique and precedential aspects
of the semiconductor dispute.
First, the dispute reveals much greater activism and willingness by
the U.S. government (both in Congress and the Executive) to manage
international trade, rather than merely to protect or assist in the ad-
justment of a domestic industry. The dispute is not one in which the
executive branch fashioned administrative protection to placate con-
gressional demands. The evolution of the issue reveals instead a pattern
of interbranch cooperation, if not one-up-manship, in negotiating an in-
ternational solution with Japan.
The form of relief fashioned for the industry was extraordinary in
U.S. trade policy as well. John Zysman and Stephen S. Cohen have
noted that, with regard to managing the problem of global surplus ca-
pacity, the United States and Japan historically have adopted funda-
mentally different approaches:
Formally, the Europeans and Japanese tend to manage excess ca-
pacity at home through cartels or cartel-like arrangements, and the
Japanese are prepared to negotiate market-sharing arrangements
internationally. Such arrangements are legally and politically diffi-
cult in most cases in the United States. In part as a result, Ameri-
can policy responds to international excess capacity through exter-
nal protection.222
217. Ehrenhaft, supra note 17, at 608.
218. John Jackson wrote in 1984, "[Tlhe U.S. legalistic system - cumbersome,
rigid, and costly as it is - in fact provides for an economy more open to imports than
virtually any other major industrial economy in the world .. " Jackson, Perspectives
on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures
in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1582 (1984).
219. DESTLER, supra note 20, at 111.
220. Id. at 112.
221. See the related chapter in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPE-
TITION, supra note 32, at 249-312.
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Although the agreement encompassed a form of protection for U.S.
producers, it marked an unusual willingness by U.S. policymakers to
enter into an international cartel-like arrangement. The particular as-
pects of the agreement which reflect this departure include the focus on
third country-market pricing'2 and the reservation of a specific share
of the Japanese market for foreign suppliers. 24 The agreement reflects
a greater willingness by the U.S. government to go beyond mere pro-
tection of domestic industry and reliance on the workings of a free
market and organize global economic adjustment.
Generally, the semiconductor issue departs from prior U.S. trade
policy in the aggressive posture that U.S. officials adopted with respect
to a high-technology trade dispute with Japan. Underlying this new ap-
proach are several emerging premises. First, a belief that Japanese and
other markets are closed to U.S. products so that a foreign nation can
target key industries for export-led growth. Second, that strong U.S.
governmental action is necessary to foice reciprocal access and combat
the impact of foreign export targeting. Third, that U.S. government
responses to industry demands for market access should be concen-
trated in leading-edge technology products because they are (a) equal
in price or quality to foreign-made products, (b) essential to America's
future economic health, and (c) important industries to U.S. national
defense.
U.S. officials may concede that, in a number of product sectors
such as automobiles and consumer electronics, Japanese products enjoy
such a competitive edge that U.S. firms cannot expect any significant
market share in Japan. In leading-edge technologies, however, the
semiconductor case reveals that American officials believe U.S. firms
are equal or superior to foreign competitors. In such cases, Congress
and the Administration are anxious to conclude that market barriers to
U.S. products exist and that dumping and/or other unfair trade prac-
tices by Japanese firms in U.S. markets must be combatted to ensure
the future competitiveness of American firms.
The tendency to be sympathetic to the demands of high-technol-
ogy industries is strengthened by the belief that the future balance of
U.S. trade will be determined by the outcome of competition in lead-
ing-edge technologies such as semiconductors. Since the beginning of
222. Double or Nothing Open Trade and Competitive Industry, 61 FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, 1124 (1983).
223. See 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 735 (June 4, 1986).
224. Id.
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the dispute, this attitude has surfaced in bilateral trade issues with Ja-
pan in high-speed ("super") computers, highly advanced integrated cir-
cuits, and biotechnology, 225 industries on which America's competitive
strength will be based in the 1990's and beyond. The words and deeds
of many members of Congress and the Administration involved in the
dispute suggest a belief that the United States is engaged in global
struggle for economic and technological supremacy, if not survival, and
that, because firms in Japan and elsewhere have the aggressive support
of their governments, U.S. firms cannot prevail without substantial as-
sistance from the U.S. government.
This departure in U.S. trade policy appears linked significantly to
concerns over U.S. national security. An essential tenet of U.S. foreign
policy is the notion that U.S. defense strategy relies heavily on main-
taining a continued and substantial technological advantage over the
Soviet Union. Until recently, the Defense Department generally op-
posed import restrictions because it wished to maintain the option of
procuring goods and components on a worldwide market.226
This Defense Department position may be changing. The Defense
Department is increasingly concerned about the extent to which the
United States is becoming dependent on foreign countries, primarily
Japan, for products and technologies considered critical to the U.S. de-
fense effort and the Department is willing to take steps to assure itself
of domestic supplies.227 These new attitudes were manifested in its op-
position to the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor by Fujitsu and in
its supporting and funding of research and development by U.S. manu-
facturers under Sematech. 228 Despite the countervailing belief that Ja-
pan is an important ally, the Defense Department does not believe that
225. See Auerbach & Gladwell, Import Ban on Genetic Item Asked, Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 1988, at Fl, col. 1.
226. See William J. Long, Institutionalizing U.S. Strategic Trade and Investment
Policy in the Department of Defense (manuscript slated for publication 1989).
227. This changing attitude may not be limited to the Department of Defense. In
April, 1988, the State Department's Office of Munitions Control ("OMC") issued revi-
sions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, implementing amendments to
the Arms Export Control Act enacted by Congress at the end of 1987. Under the new
regulations, companies must reveal whether they are owned or controlled by foreign
persons at the time they apply for registration. Registrants must also provide written
notice to the OMC 60 days in advance of a sale or transfer of ownership or control to a
foreign firm. The notification requirements could lead to restrictions on particular ac-
quisitions in the high technology defense contract sector, resulting in more situations
similar to the failed effort by Fujitsu to acquire Fairchild
Semiconductor.
228. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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the United States can afford to rely on any foreign supplier for prod-
ucts and technologies essential to the defense effort.229 The semiconduc-
tor issue may presage a new and important Defense Department role in
leading edge technology trade during an era when the U.S. remains
predominant militarily, but not necessarily economically or
technologically.
In addition to reflecting some new directions in U.S. trade policy
generally, the prosecution and resolution of the dispute also reflects a
further politicization of U.S. trade laws. As noted, the agreement was
unique in its scope, focusing on dumping and pricing practices in third-
country markets as well as in the U.S. market. The antidumping inves-
tigation itself was unique because it extended protection to future gen-
eration products not yet imported into the United States, such as chips
with memory capacity beyond 256K; virtually unique in the Commerce
Department's decision to self-initiate that investigation; 30 and unprece-
dented in the Commerce Department's decision, announced personally
by Secretary Baldridge, to accelerate its preliminary finding of dump-
ing in that case so as to coincide with other deadlines and thereby in-
crease pressure on the Japanese to settle the dispute. This further
politicization of the trade laws enhances the likelihood that U.S. trade
laws will be used as a tool for increasing political pressure, rather than
as an escape valve for protectionist demands, and that the laws will lose
their credibility internationally as relatively fair and impartial mea-
sures for resolving trade disputes.
The public funding of Sematech at $100 million a year for five
years is also a remarkable departure in U.S. economic policy. Inspired
by the basic economic and national security concerns noted above, 31
Sematech, a quasi-public research, development, and manufacturing
consortium dedicated to promoting the worldwide competitiveness of
the U.S. industry, adopted another Japanese model for economic suc-
cess." ' At issue is the wisdom of government targeting of specific in-
dustrial sectors for support, loosely called "industrial policy," in con-
trast to the federal government's traditional reliance on markets to
229. See Long, supra note 226.
230. The Commerce Department recently compiled a list of Japanese products it
believed were being dumped on the U.S. market and has actively encouraged domestic
industries to seek redress from these pricing practices under U.S. dumping laws.
231. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
232. Richard Rosecrance has noted that, ultimately, it is not the American model
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ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE (1985).
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decide how and when industries will grow and contract. 33
B. The International Trading System
The EC was an uninvited guest to the dispute. It viewed the agree-
ment as a threat to its trading interests.13 As mentioned, shortly after
the conclusion of the agreement the EC requested, under Articles XXII
and XXIII(2) and the GATT Antidumping Code, an investigation of
the legality of the accord. The EC alleged: (1) Japan's monitoring of
semiconductor prices to third-country markets violated the EC's rights
under GATT's Antidumping Code;235 (2) the agreement to set aside
the Japanese semiconductor market for foreign producers violated the
most-favored-nation principle; 230 and (3) the agreement was not trans-
parent and ran contrary to the commitments renewed at Punte del
Este, Uruguay for continued openness and multilateral solutions to
trade problems.137 Under GATT dispute resolution procedures, the EC
claim was referred to a dispute resolution panel.238 On March 24, the
panel announced the Japanese enforcement of third-country pricing
provisions of the agreement violates the GATT.2 39
The Japanese Government had used administrative guidance on
pricing and production controls and delays of export licensing requests
to raise third-country prices to the level required by the agreement.
240
The GATT panel agreed with the EC allegations that the combined
effect of these measures violated GATT's prohibition on quantitative
export restrictions, constituting, in effect, export quotas.241 The GATT
panel upheld the legality of other provisions of the agreement chal-
lenged by the EC, including the Japanese commitment to increase mar-
ket access for U.S. manufacturers.242
On May 4, Japan accepted the GATT panel's determination.
4 3
The United States welcomed Japan's decision to develop an alternative
233. At the time of this writing, domestic electronic firms and SIA had also an-
nounced a nine-point agreement to increase U.S. DRAM production and to reduce
dependency on Japanese suppliers. The proposal quickly won the endorsement of Secre-
tary of Commerce William Verity and U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter.
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monitoring system, rather than abandon the agreement, and has pro-
posed negotiations to assist Japan.244 U.S. officials admitted that it will
be difficult for Japan to balance the interests of the EC, which is call-
ing for the exclusion of government involvement in semiconductor ex-
ports, with those of the United States, which believes government in-
volvement is necessary to assure compliance with the agreement.2 45
Whatever the final outcome, it is fair to speculate that the dispute
and agreement constitute a significant departure from the spirit of the
GATT. The GATT is founded on the notion that the rules of the inter-
national trading system would be made on a multilateral basis.2" Fur-
ther, the GATT aspires to the evenhanded application of transparent
rules.24 Moreover, it is undertstood that the major economic powers,
particularly the United States, have primary responsibility for policing
these rules.248
In contrast to these fundamental principles, the agreement is di-
rected to managing the prices of Japanese semiconductors worldwide.
Despite the global scope of the agreement and its affects on prices, it is
an exclusive, bilateral deal founded on confidential price and cost data.
Moreover, the deal was struck between the two most powerful national
actors in the GATT: the United States, which has maintained a leader-
ship position in the GATT since its inception, and Japan, the nation
most capable of assuming increasing leadership responsibility in the
GATT. Needless to say, the dispute does not commend the GATT's
continued effectiveness.
The dispute and its resolution also raise the broader question of
the implications of America's increasing bilateralism in trade and its
declining commitment to GATT's principles of diffuse reciprocity, and
universal procedural rules.2" 9 This involves the assumption that the cost
and benefits of free trade will balance out in the long run and will be
optimal for any one nation. Clearly, the semiconductor dispute, with its
precise demands for market share and pricing, constitutes a further
movement away from such principles and suggests that the United
244. Specific proposals Japan has discussed with the United States and the EC
include imposition of an export tax, relinquishing monitoring procedures to the Japa-
nese semiconductor industry, and cooperation among GATT members to monitor im-
port prices of Japanese chips.
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States is willing to adopt the principle of specific reciprocity.5 in
sectoral negotiations with Japan. With a sectoral approach based on
specific reciprocal relations comes, necessarily, complicated and dis-
criminatory administrative mechanisms and rules and the inoperability
of multilateral mechanisms such as the GATT.
250. Id. It secures roughly equivalent advantage for a delimited set of
transactions.
19881

